OH - Incorrect sentences must be fixed according to the law

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Sentencing someone twice for the same crime? That is totally unconstitutional!

08/03/2008



When Curtis Simpkins pleaded guilty to two counts of rape and one count of gross sexual imposition in May 1998, a subsequent error in his sentencing would eventually take his case through the Ohio legal system until it came before us - the Supreme Court of Ohio.



Here's what happened: After pleading guilty, Simpkins was sentenced in June 1998 to a term of eight years' incarceration for each count of rape and to three years for the single count of gross sexual imposition, to be served concurrently.



The sentence carried a requirement for post-release control - or what used to be commonly referred to as probation. But the journal entry that recorded his sentence did not indicate that Simpkins was subject to post-release control. That error went uncorrected for more than seven years.



In December 2005, however, the state discovered the mistake and filed a motion to resentence Simpkins prior to his release from prison. The state asserted that the original sentence was void because it had not included post-release control.



The trial court held a hearing on the motion while Simpkins was still in custody and agreed that the initial sentence was void. The court then resentenced Simpkins to the same sentence as before, but added a period of five years' post-release control.



Simpkins, as you might guess, filed an appeal. In support of his appeal, Simpkins argued that a decision by our court - in a case from 2006 - does not support the after-the-fact resentencing of a defendant who has nearly completed his sentence. But the court of appeals rejected his claim.



The court of appeals explained that the trial court "retained its jurisdiction to resentence" Simpkins. Ohio law mandates that a trial court impose a term of post-release control for the offenses to which Simpkins pleaded guilty. Therefore, according to the court of appeals, the trial court must impose post-release control "orally at the sentencing hearing and transcribe such imposition in the court's journal entry. Failure to do so renders the sentence void." Because his 1998 sentence was void, the court of appeals said resentencing was a proper remedy to correct the trial court's original error of omission.



After that ruling by the court of appeals, Simpkins's case came before us. Writing for the majority of our court, Justice Maureen O'Connor said, "This appeal requires us to balance the doctrine of res judicata...and the people's interest in the imposition of lawful, proper sentences."



What is "res judicata?" It's a Latin term, as so many legal terms are, meaning, "an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision." Another way of putting it is, "a matter once judicially decided is finally decided." Or think of it in terms of baseball - once the umpire calls a strike, it's a strike; the issue is settled.



The doctrine of res judicata is meant to give a certain finality to things. As it pertains to this case then, the question is: Once a defendant is sentenced - even if the sentence is improper - can the state obtain a new sentence, or does the doctrine of res judicata prevent that since the matter has been judicially decided?



Simpkins maintained that the state is barred by res judicata from challenging the trial court's failure to include the period of post-release control. He also argued that he had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence and that the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution protect that expectation.



By a six-to-one vote, we disagreed with Simpkins' arguments. Why? In a series of cases stretching back to 1984 our court has consistently held that a sentence that does not include a term that is required by law - such as post-release control - is a void sentence.



The underpinning of those 24 years of decisions, Justice O'Connor wrote, "is the fundamental understanding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law. Because no judge has the authority to disregard the law, a sentence that clearly does so is void."



A trial court's jurisdiction over a criminal case is limited after it renders judgment, but it retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence and is authorized to do so. "Indeed," Justice O'Connor wrote, "it has an obligation to do so when its error is apparent."



What about Simpkins's res judicata argument? In a number of previous decisions, our court and the United States Supreme Court have said that res judicata is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice that "is to be applied in particular situations as fairness and justice require, and that ... is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or so as to work an injustice."



As Justice O'Connor points out, "We would achieve neither fairness nor justice by permitting a void sentence to stand." Although res judicata is an important doctrine, it is not so vital that it can override "society's interest in enforcing the law, and in meting out the punishment the legislature has deemed just."



Justice O'Connor added that, "Every judge has a duty to impose lawful sentences. The interests that underlie res judicata, although critically important, do not override our duty to sentence defendants as required by the law. Similarly, a prosecutor cannot bind the people or a court to an unlawful or otherwise void sentence by failing to appeal it properly.



"Neither constitutional principles nor the doctrine of res judicata require that sentencing become a game in which a wrong move by the judge or prosecutor means immunity for a defendant."



What about Simpkins's claim that his resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy or Due Process Clauses? Given that his sentence was issued without the authority of law and that Simpkins was represented by an attorney, "we find that there was not unfair surprise or prejudice to Simpkins in his resentencing. Because he did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence, Simpkins could be resentenced without offending the Double Jeopardy or Due Process Clauses."